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Abstract
We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfect
competition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity a⁄ect
income distribution across factors. Whenever ￿nal goods are gross-substitutes (gross-
complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factor
or the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product dif-
ferentiation and higher ￿xed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests
that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in
the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among ma-
jor explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill
complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism
underlying the skill bias of scale.
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11 Introduction
Understanding the e⁄ects of changes in market size on factor rewards is of central impor-
tance in many contexts. It is well recognized that international trade, technical progress and
factor accumulation are all vehicles for market expansion. Yet, despite the interest for the
distributional e⁄ects of each of these phenomena, very little e⁄ort has been devoted to study
the distributional consequences of the increase in the scale of economic activity they all bring
about. This is the goal of our paper. In particular, we study the e⁄ects of a market size expan-
sion in a two-sector, two-factor, general equilibrium model with increasing returns, imperfect
competition and endogenous markups. Our main result is that, under fairly general conditions,
scale is non-neutral on income distribution.
Given that there is no uni￿ed theory of imperfect competition, we derive our main results
within three widely used models: contestable markets (Baumol et al, 1982), quantity compe-
tition (Cournot) and price competition with di⁄erentiated products (Lancaster, 1979). These
models share a number of reasonable characteristics: the presence of ￿rm-level ￿xed costs, free
entry (no extra-pro￿ts) and, most important, the property that the degree of competition is
endogenous and varies with market size. In particular, as in Krugman (1979), in these models
a scale expansion involves a pro-competitive e⁄ect which forces ￿rms to lower markups and
increase their output to cover the ￿xed costs. This is a key feature for our purpose.
We allow the two sectors to di⁄er in terms of factor-intensity, degree of product di⁄er-
entiation, ￿xed and marginal costs. On the demand side, the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between ￿nal goods is allowed to di⁄er from one. Under these assumptions,
we show that any increase in market size is generally non-neutral on relative factor rewards.
More precisely, whenever ￿nal goods are gross-substitutes, a scale expansion raises the rela-
tive reward of the factor used intensively in the less competitive sector. This is the sector
characterized by a combination of smaller employment of factors, higher degree of product
di⁄erentiation and higher ￿xed costs. An interesting implication of our result is that, in the
absence of sectoral asymmetries in technology or demand, a scale expansion bene￿ts the factor
that is scarcer in absolute terms (i.e., in smaller supply). The converse happens when ￿nal
goods are gross-complements, while it is only in the knife-edge case of a unitary elasticity of
substitution that scale is always neutral on income distribution.
The reason for this result is that, in the models we study, equilibrium economies of scale fall
with the degree of competition. This is a natural implication of oligopolistic models approach-
ing perfect competition as market size tends to in￿nity. As a consequence, a less competitive
sector has more to gain from market enlargement, in the sense that a larger market would
e⁄ectively increase its productivity relative to the rest of the economy and hence expand (re-
duce) its income share if the elasticity of substitution in consumption is greater (lower) than
2one.
Our characterization of the factor-bias of scale has several theoretical implications. Given
that intra-industry trade between similar countries can be isomorphic to an increase in market
size, our theory suggests which factor stands to gain more from it. In doing so, it ￿lls a gap
in the new trade theory, where the distributional implications of two-way trade in goods with
similar factor-intensity are often overlooked (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Likewise, our
theory suggests that technical progress, by increasing market size, is non-neutral on income
distribution, thus contributing to the recent literature on the factor-bias of technical progress
(e.g., Acemoglu, 2002, 2005). Finally, our results imply that factor demand curves may be
upward sloping for low levels of factor employment: if the endowment of some factor is very
small, the sector using the factor intensively may be subject to increasing returns so strong
that a marginal increase in the factor supply actually raises its reward.
We also provide two extensions of our framework. First, we derive simple conditions for
the factor-bias of scale within the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, a very
tractable and widely used model featuring constant markups. We show that the results are
very similar to those mentioned earlier, although the mechanism is di⁄erent, since it does not
rely on the pro-competitive e⁄ect of scale but rather on external increasing returns arising from
a variety e⁄ect. Second, we brie￿ y discuss the distributional e⁄ects of a biased scale expansion,
i.e., an endowment increase associated with a change in the factor ratio. This exercise can be
isomorphic to trade integration among countries that di⁄er in relative factor scarcity and
helps understand how the factor-bias of scale may alter the distributional implications of the
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. Interestingly, we show that, if the scale e⁄ect is strong
enough, a factor that is scarce both in absolute terms and relative to other countries may
experinece an increase in its relative reward after trade opening. In other words, under certain
conditions, the mechamism we emphasize may overturn the Stolper-Samuelson prediction.
A prominent application of our results is in the debate over the causes of the widespread
rise in wage inequality that took place since the early 1980s. The theoretical literature has
identi￿ed three main culprits: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarity and
international trade. Our theory suggests the existence of a neglected link among these ex-
planations, namely, the skill bias of scale. In this respect, we review evidence showing that
skilled workers, in any country, constitute a minority of the labor force, are employed in sec-
tors where plant-level ￿xed costs are high and produce highly di⁄erentiated goods that are
gross-substitutes for low skill-intensive products. Under these circumstances, our theory im-
plies that scale is skill-biased, thereby providing a microfoundation for the perpetual increase
in the relative demand for skilled workers.1 Moreover, since technical change, as well as factor
1See, among others, Wood (1998) for evidence on the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor.
3accumulation and trade integration all imply a market size increase, we conclude that they are
essentially skill-biased phenomena, even in the absence of technology biases, complementarity
among inputs or Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ects.
Finally, we provide evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale. In par-
ticular, we confront our theory with data from the NBER productivity ￿le, a unique database
on industry-level inputs and outputs widely used to investigate the determinants of the rise in
wage inequality in the US. We ￿nd strong evidence that markups fall when industry size rises
and that they fall by more in the skill-intensive industries, where they are higher. In line with
our model￿ s predictions, these results suggest that the pro-competitive e⁄ect of scale expansion
is stronger in the skill-intensive industries, which are less competitive and hence bene￿t more
from industry expansion. We conclude by comparing our ￿ndings with the related literature
on wage inequality.
2 Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and Factor Prices
Consider a country endowed with Vi units of factor i and Vj units of factor j, where two ￿nal
goods are produced. Consumers have identical homothetic preferences, represented by the










where Yi (Yj) stands for consumption of the ￿nal good intensive in factor i (j), and ￿ is
the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. ￿ is a parameter capturing the relative
importance in consumption of the i-intensive good. The relative demand for the two goods











where Pi and Pj are the ￿nal prices of goods Yi and Yj, respectively.
We focus deliberately on sectoral production functions that are homothetic in the inputs
they use, or else the non-neutrality of scale would be merely an assumption. It follows that,
as also shown below, a scale expansion that leaves Vi=Vj unchanged can a⁄ect relative factor
prices (wi=wj) only as long as it changes the income shares of sectors. In turn, equation (2)
implies that relative sectoral shares are entirely characterized by either the relative price of
2We assume CES preferences for tractability, although our results do not depend crucially on the assumption
that the price elasticity be constant. While more general demand systems would certainly complicate the
analysis, our results would hold at least ￿locally￿ .




















To see the e⁄ect of scale, note that homotheticity of Yi implies that its dual total cost
function Ci takes the separable form Ci (wi;wj;Yi) = e ci (wi;wj)e(Yi), with e0 (Yi) > 0. Then,












Di⁄erentiating it with respect to wi=wj, Yi and Yj, we can compute the impact of marginal
























b Yi ￿ b Yj
￿
(4)
where a hat denotes a proportional variation, e cii ￿ @e ci=@ (wi=wj) and e cji ￿ @e cj=@ (wi=wj).
Note that e cii=e ci > e cji=e cj, since Yi is by assumption intensive in factor i. Note, also, that the
term
e0(Yi)Yi
e(Yi) is the output elasticity of the total cost function, an inverse measure of returns to
scale. It can be shown (see, e.g., Hanoch, 1975) that its reciprocal equals the scale elasticity of
sectoral output (eYi



















i and V i
j are employment of factors i and j in sector Yi, while s > 0 is a scaling
parameter, evaluated at s = 1. Using (5) into (4) we obtain the change in relative factor
































and ￿ 6= 1. The intuition for this result is simple. After a scale
increase, output grows relatively more in sectors with stronger increasing returns; if goods are
gross substitutes (￿ > 1) prices react less than quantities, so that the income share of the high-
increasing returns sector expands and so does the relative return of its intensive factor. The
converse happens when goods are gross-complements (￿ < 1), while it is only in the knife-edge
case of a unitary elasticity of substitution that income shares are always scale-invariant.
What are then the determinants of returns to scale? To address this question, we ￿rst note
5that in models of imperfect competition featuring free entry and ￿xed costs in production,
increasing returns and market power are closely related. Since ￿rms charge a price in excess of
marginal costs, the markup function, R(￿), de￿ned as the ratio of average to marginal revenue,
is a measure of monopoly power. Likewise, the function ￿(￿), de￿ned as the ratio of average
to marginal cost, is a measure of economies of scale internal to ￿rms. When pro￿ts are driven
down to zero by free entry, in equilibrium the degree of monopoly power must be equal to the
degree of economies of scale:3 R(￿) = ￿(￿). The reason is that operational pro￿ts (i.e., the
surplus over variable costs) must be just enough to cover ￿xed costs and ￿xed costs generate
increasing returns. This immediately suggests that sectors may di⁄er in increasing returns
because of di⁄erences in market power.
The models we study next explore this possibility and show how the factor-bias of scale
depends on basic parameters. Before moving on, we want to stress an important point: in-
creasing returns at the ￿rm level matter only as long as the scale of production of a typical
￿rm grows with overall market size. We consider this a realistic property and focus on market
structures (the majority) where it holds; however, we will also see that our results extend to
some form of increasing returns that are external to ￿rms.
To anticipate our main ￿ndings, we will see that in the simplest case of contestable markets,
where there is a single ￿rm per sector and the price equals average cost, increasing returns
depend only on the ratio of ￿xed cost to sectoral output. Clearly, smaller sectors enjoy stronger
increasing returns. The Cournot case of competition in quantities will show that in general
market power also depends on demand conditions, such as the elasticity of substitution between
products. High substitutability implies a very elastic demand that limits the ability of ￿rms
to charge high markups, thereby translating into low increasing returns. Price competition
with di⁄erentiated products (following the ideal variety approach) will demonstrate that the
Cournot result is not a special one; further and more importantly, it will illustrate another
source of increasing returns common in models with product di⁄erentiation: scale economies
external to ￿rms due to a preference for variety in aggregate. Instead of modifying our previous
￿ndings, this new element will just reinforce them. As a comparison, we will also show that in
the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition, where ￿rm size is constant, only
this latter e⁄ect survives.
We now turn to the detailed analysis of speci￿c cases. To preserve the highest transparency,
we limit our study to the simplest speci￿c-factors model, where ￿ = wiVi=wjVj. As shown
above, similar results can in fact be derived from any homothetic sectoral production functions,
provided that the factor-intensity di⁄ers across sectors.4
3See Helpman and Krugman (1985) for a formal derivation.
4To have a sense of how our results carry over to the case of non-extreme factor-intensities, in the Appendix
62.1 Contestable Markets
We start with one of the simplest forms of imperfect competition: contestable markets in
which the threat of entry drives down prices to average costs even if goods are produced
by monopolists. Assume that there are many potential competitors (indexed by v) who can
produce good Yi with the same technology. In particular, the total cost function of each
producer in sector i entails a ￿xed requirement, Fi, and a constant marginal requirement, ci,
of e¢ ciency units of factor i:
Ci (v) = [Fi + ciyi (v)]wi; (7)
where yi (v) is the amount produced by a single ￿rm and wi is the reward of one unit of factor
i.
A contestable market equilibrium is de￿ned by the following conditions: market clearing
(i.e.,
P
v yi (v) = Yi), feasibility (meaning that no ￿rm is making losses) and sustainability
(requiring that no ￿rm can pro￿tably undercut the market price). An implication of these
conditions is that any good must be produced by a single monopolist and priced at average
cost. Then, imposing full employment,
[Fi + ciYi] = Vi;





Analogous conditions apply to sector j. Substituting (8) (and the analogous for sector j) into


















Intuitively, the relative price of factor i is higher the higher the relative importance of the
i-intensive good in consumption, as captured by ￿. Further, when ￿ > 1, relative rewards are
decreasing in relative marginal costs (ci=cj). In fact, with an elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption greater than one, a higher relative marginal cost raises the relative price of the ￿nal
good and reduces its expenditure share because consumers demand more than proportionally
the cheaper good. Finally, the term (Vj=Vi)1=￿ captures the standard scarcity e⁄ect: ceteris
paribus, the relative price of a factor is higher the lower its relative supply.
we illustrate the contestable markets model in the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions.
7More interestingly, from equation (9) it is easy to see that whenever goods are gross sub-
stitutes (i.e., if ￿ > 1) an increase in scale that leaves the relative endowment unchanged raises







The converse is true when ￿nal goods are gross-complements (i.e., ￿ < 1). Finally, the relative
factor reward is always scale-invariant if and only if ￿ = 1.
The reason for this result is the following: the presence of a ￿xed costs introduces ￿rm-level
increasing returns that fall with output. With only one ￿rm in each sector, the same increasing






which is greater than one and decreasing in Vi=Fi. Note that in the simplest model of con-
testable markets, there are no other determinants of market power, and increasing returns thus
depend only on endowments and technology (Vi and Fi). Next we will see that in more general
models market power and increasing returns also depend on demand parameters.
2.2 Quantity Competition
We consider now a model with product di⁄erentiation that includes some elements of strategic
interaction: ￿rms producing the same good compete in quantities taking each other￿ s output as
given. As shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), under mild conditions quantity competition
can also be interpreted as the outcome of a two-stage model of capacity choice followed by
price competition. Since Yi represents the output of a large macro-sector, we think it is
realistic to assume that individual ￿rms cannot a⁄ect its price. Therefore, we view goods
Yi and Yj as produced by perfectly competitive ￿rms assembling at no cost own-industry
di⁄erentiated intermediate goods.5 In particular, we assume that in each sector there is a
continuum of intermediates of measure one and that the production functions for ￿nal goods










5Equivalently, Yi and Yj can be interpreted as consumption baskets of i- and j-intensive goods and Y as a
utility function.
8where Yi (v) is the total amount of the intermediate good type v used in the production of
good i, and ￿i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among any two varieties of intermediates








where pi (v) is the price of the intermediate good type v used in the production of good i.
Imperfectly competitive ￿rms operate at the more disaggregated level of intermediate in-
dustries. Each intermediate v is an homogeneous good produced by a ￿nite number ni(v) of
symmetric ￿rms engaging in Cournot competition. Again, the production of each intermediate
v in sector i involves a ￿xed requirement, Fi, and a constant marginal requirement, ci, so
that the total cost function for a producer of variety v in sector i is still given by (7). Pro￿t
maximization by intermediate ￿rms, taking output of other competitors as given, implies the
following pricing rule:







where the markup depends on the number of competing ￿rms. A free-entry condition in each









[Fi + ciyi (v)]ni (v) = Vi;
where Vi is the supply of factor i. Using this condition together with the free entry condition
yields the equilibrium number of ￿rms in each industry and the output produced by each of
them:














Note that a scale increase (i.e., an increase in Vi) is associated with a rise in ￿rms￿output.
This is a direct consequence of the pro-competitive e⁄ect of a market size expansion, which
reduces price-marginal cost markups and forces ￿rms to increase output to cover ￿xed costs.
Finally, note that symmetry implies:
Yi = Yi (v) = niyi; Pi = pi(v) = pi: (16)
9The same conditions apply to sector j. The relative factor reward can be found by substituting





















Equation (17) is almost identical to (9). In particular, the relative factor price (wi=wj) de-
pends on basic parameters (￿, ￿; ci=cj and Vi=Vj) as in the previous model. The only notable
di⁄erence is in the condition for the factor-bias of scale: under Cournot competition, if ￿nal
goods are gross-substitutes (i.e., ￿ > 1), an increase in scale that leaves the relative endowment







Again, the converse is true when ￿nal goods are gross-substitutes (i.e., if ￿ < 1), while relative
factor rewards are scale-invariant if and only if ￿ = 1. Compared to (10), the new condition
shows that product di⁄erentiation (or, equivalently, the elasticity of substitution between va-
rieties within a single sector) also matters for the factor-bias of scale: factors used intensively
in the production of more di⁄erentiated products (low ￿i) tend to bene￿t more from a market
size increase.
The di⁄erence with the previous case is easily explained. As before, in equilibrium sectoral
increasing returns are proportional to markups. In fact, using equations (13) and (14) it
is possible to see that (18) holds whenever the markup is higher in the i-intensive sector.
However, while under contestable markets markups are determined uniquely by technological
factors (the ratio of ￿xed costs to endowments), now they also depend on demand conditions:
when a sector produces varieties that are highly substitutable, ￿rms cannot charge high prices,
which in turn implies that markups and increasing returns must be low in equilibrium.
The mechanism at work in this model is similar to the one we discussed before. The
pro-competitive e⁄ect implies that ￿rms￿output grows with market size. For this reason,
sectoral production functions exhibit increasing returns to scale that fall with market size, just
like that of any single ￿rm. Substituting (14) and (15) into (16) to derive an expression for
sectoral production functions in terms of parameters, it is straightforward to show that the







which is greater than one and decreasing in Vi￿i=Fi. Together with equation (6), (19) shows
10how variable increasing returns at the sectoral level determine the factor-bias of scale.
2.3 Price Competition
We consider now the case of price competition with di⁄erentiated products, following the ￿ideal
variety￿approach of Salop (1979) and Lancaster (1979). We depart from the previous analysis
in the choice of market structure within each di⁄erentiated industry.
It will prove convenient to work with the limit case where intermediate goods Yi (v) are
not substitutable, i.e., lim￿i ! 0, so that (11) becomes Leontief. This assumption is not
just for analytical convenience but also to keep the analysis as close to the previous setup
as possible. In fact, in the Cournot case ￿rms within the same intermediate industry were
producing an homogeneous good; therefore, to study how product di⁄erentiation, with its
e⁄ect on competition, in￿ uences the relationship between scale and factor rewards, we needed
the parameter ￿i, capturing an exogenous component of ￿rms market power coming from
product (or demand) characteristics speci￿c to each sector. In this section, instead, we use
a model where product di⁄erentiation arises within each intermediate industry and we do
not need to study additional e⁄ects of product di⁄erentiation between intermediate industries.
Therefore, we simplify the interdependence between intermediate industries by assuming that
all the varieties in (11) are demanded in the same amount. Our results do not depend on this
assumption.
Within each intermediate industry producing yi (v) there is a continuum of potential types
and we imagine a one-to-one correspondence between these types and the points on the cir-
cumference (of unit length) of a circle, which represents the product space. Competitive ￿rms
buying intermediates to assemble the bundle Yi have preferences over these types; in particular,
we assume that each buyer has an ideal type, represented by a speci￿c point on the circle. In
order to assemble the ￿nal good using a type other than the most preferred, a ￿rm incurs an
additional cost that is higher the further away the intermediate is located from the ideal type.
We model this cost of ￿distance￿in the product space as a standard ￿iceberg￿transportation
cost: one unit of a type located at arc distance x from the ideal one is equivalent to only e￿xdi
units of ideal type. Therefore, if pi (v) is the price of the ideal type, the price of an equivalent
unit bought by a ￿rm located at distance x will be pi (v)exdi. Note that the function exdi, Lan-
caster￿ s compensation function, parametrizes the degree of product di⁄erentiation. As di ! 0,
di⁄erent types become perfect substitutes, as nobody would be willing to pay any extra cost
to buy a speci￿c type of good. We will see shortly that di plays in this context the same role
of 1=￿i in the previous model.
We restrict again the analysis to symmetric equilibria, so that all ￿rms in the same sector set







Figure 1: Price competition with di⁄erentiated products
uniformly distributed at random on each circular product space. We also assume that sellers
are located equidistant from one another on each circle.6 Given that there is a continuum [0;1]
of these circles, by the law of large numbers every buyer faces the same unit cost of producing
good Yi. Assuming that ni(v) ￿rms have entered the market for yi (v), we can calculate demand
for each ￿rm as follows. Suppose that ￿rm v￿, represented graphically in Figure 1 as a point
on the product space of industry v, sets a price pi (v￿) for its type. A buyer whose ideal type
is located at distance x 2 (0;1=ni(v)) from v￿ is indi⁄erent between purchasing from ￿rm v￿
and from its closest neighbor on the circle v0 if:




Therefore, given the prices pi (v), (20) implicitly de￿nes the market width for any single ￿rm:
all buyers whose ideal type is within the arc distance x from type v￿ are customers of ￿rm v￿.
Note that, in general, an increase in the price set by a ￿rm will have two e⁄ects. First, as shown
in (20), it reduces the measure of customers who buy that type and, second, it reduces the
quantity demanded by the remaining customers. The Leontief assumption cancels the second
e⁄ect, so that demand for each ￿rm can be derived from (20) as:











6It can be shown that this is indeed optimal. The reason is that a ￿rm that tries to change slightly its
location loses on one side of its market the same number of customers that it gains on the other side. Hence,
small changes in location do not alter the quantity demanded.
12where Yi is the aggregate sectoral output that would be produced if optimal types where
always used. Pro￿t maximization given (21) and the already introduced cost function (7) yield
a familiar pricing formula (after imposing symmetry):







Note that, as in the Cournot case, the markup over marginal cost decreases with ni (v). More-
over, setting di = 1=￿i, (22) reduces exactly to (13). Hence, in our speci￿cation, ￿rm￿ s behavior
under Cournot competition within di⁄erentiated industries is isomorphic to that under price
competition with di⁄erentiated products in each industry. The rest of the analysis is also sim-
ilar. In particular, free-entry and market clearing still apply so that the equilibrium number
of ￿rms and their output are given by (14) and (15) after substituting di = 1=￿i. This imme-
diately implies that in both models markups and internal increasing returns depend on scale
in exactly the same way.
However, there is an important di⁄erence in how production of intermediates, ni (v)yi (v),
translates into output of the ￿nal good Yi and thus (from equation 3) into the price of factors.
In the Cournot case, the bene￿t of having a higher number of ￿rms lies in the pro-competitive
e⁄ect and therefore in a better exploitation of scale economies that are internal to ￿rms,
whereas now there is an additional bene￿t of scale in that buyers will be on average closer to
their ideal type. This is a source of increasing returns at sectoral level. To see this, note that
output of ￿nal goods, Yi, equals the total amount of intermediates produced in any industry




















= 1, one can show that ￿nal output in sector i grows
to Yi as the number of available types grows to in￿nity (ni ! 1) or types become perfect
substitutes (di ! 0). Given that the additional e⁄ect depends on ni=di just like markups,
external and internal increasing returns share the same determinants and the new mechanism
simply reinforces the scale e⁄ect found in the Cournot case. In fact, setting di = 1=￿i and


















c is the relative reward in equation (17). Simple inspection reveals that the
13condition for the factor-bias of scale is identical to the previous case (18).
This third case has illustrated an additional reason why scale can be biased: asymmetries in
increasing returns that are external to ￿rms and arise from a preference for variety in aggregate.
This new e⁄ect does not alter our previous conclusions because it depends on the elasticity of
substitution between varieties and the number of ￿rms, just like market power.
2.4 Dixit-Stiglitz Monopolistic Competition
We now brie￿ y consider the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition, a widely
used model and a prominent toolbox in the new trade theory.7 The purpose of this section is
to show that, although we will be able to ￿nd a simple condition for scale to be factor-biased
consistent with that of previous models, the mechanism behind it di⁄ers in an important
respect, for it does not rely on the pro-competitive e⁄ect emphasized so far. As we will see,
in this model ￿rm size and markups are ￿xed exogenously and the factor-bias of scale only
depends on asymmetries in external increasing returns due to the variety e⁄ect discussed at
the end of section 2.3.
Consider the Cournot model of section 2.2 and allow the range of varieties produced in










We assume that there is a potentially in￿nite measure of producible varieties. Thus, the ￿xed
costs in (7) assures that no two ￿rms will ￿nd it pro￿table to produce the same variety and
each will be sold by a monopolist. Then, the pricing rule (13) simpli￿es to:







showing that the markup is now constant and only depends on ￿i. The measure of ￿rms in each
sector is determined endogenously by a free entry condition: new ￿rms (and thus varieties) are
created up to the point where pro￿ts are driven to zero. Imposing ￿i = 0 yields the scale of
production for each ￿rm:
yi (v) = yi =
Fi (￿i ￿ 1)
ci
: (25)
Combined with full employment, (Fi + ciyi)ni = Vi; (25) gives the equilibrium measure of





7This case is studied more in details in Epifani and Gancia (2002).
14which completes the characterization of the equilibrium.
The relative factor reward can be found by substituting ni (26) and yi (25) into Yi (24),































Clearly, for ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1), an increase in scale that leaves the relative endowment (Vi=Vj)
unchanged raises the relative price of factor i as long as ￿i < ￿j (￿i > ￿j), while in the case
￿ = 1 the relative factor reward is always scale invariant. Given that the scale of production of
each ￿rm is ￿xed, an increase in market size does not allow to better exploit scale economies
at the ￿rm level. A larger market only translates into a wider range of di⁄erentiated products,
which is bene￿cial because aggregate productivity in (24) grows with variety. Using (26) and






Thus, asymmetries in returns to scale only depend on di⁄erences between ￿i and ￿j. Yet, even
in this case scale turns out to be biased in favor of the factor used intensively in the sector
where markups are higher.
It should also be noted that a constant markup is usually seen as a limit of the Dixit-Stiglitz
otherwise convenient formulation. This property is sometimes removed by assuming that
demand becomes more elastic when the number of varieties increases, that is, ￿i = f(ni), with
f0 (ni) > 0, as in Krugman (1979). Using (26) it is easy to see that the elasticity of substitution
becomes an increasing function of the ratio of endowments to ￿xed costs: ￿if￿1 (￿i) = Vi=Fi.
In this case, the condition for the factor-bias of scale reduces to (10), just as in the contestable
markets model.
2.5 Discussion
We have shown how in models with increasing returns and imperfect competition market size
a⁄ects income distribution across factors: whenever ￿nal goods are gross-substitutes (gross-
complements), a scale expansion tends to raise (lower) the relative reward of the factor used
intensively in the sector characterized by smaller factor employment, higher degree of product
di⁄erentiation and higher ￿xed costs. In this section, we pause to discuss some properties of
our results, their implications and the realism of the key assumptions on which they are built.
A ￿rst notable implication of conditions (10) and (18) is that, in the absence of sectoral
15asymmetries in ￿xed costs (Fi = Fj) or in the degree of substitutability among varieties
(￿i = ￿j), a scale expansion bene￿ts the scarce factor in the economy. Second, since the scale
elasticity of sectoral outputs converges to one for Vi approaching asymptotically in￿nity, the
factor-bias of scale vanishes when the scale grows very large. However, this will be the case
only once prices have become approximately equal to marginal costs in both sectors. On the
contrary, when the endowment of a factor is very low, increasing returns may be so high that
the reward of that factor actually rises with its supply. In other words, the factor demand
curve may be at ￿rst upward sloping.8 For example, in the model of quantity competition, it is
easy to show from (17) that the relative reward of factor i, wi=wj, increases with its supply Vi
as long as (Fi=Vi￿i)
1=2 > 2=(￿ ￿ 1). Clearly, this is possible only if goods are gross substitutes,
and more likely the higher is the elasticity of substitution ￿.9 Third, while the relative real
marginal cost (ci=cj) and the bias in demand (￿) a⁄ect the level of the relative factor reward,
they have no e⁄ect on its scale elasticity. The reason is that markups are independent of
marginal costs, while the bias in consumption only shifts income between sectors, which is
immaterial for the factor-bias of scale given homotheticity of technologies.
Our theory yields novel predictions on the distributional e⁄ects of international trade and
technical progress. First, it suggests that factor augmenting technical progress, by increasing
the e⁄ective market size of an economy, will tend to increase the marginal product of factors
used intensively in the least competitive sectors. Second and perhaps more important, given
that intra-industry trade between similar countries can be isomorphic to an increase in market
size, our theory suggests which factor stands to gain more from it. In doing so, it ￿lls a
gap in the new trade theory, where the distributional implications of two-way trade in goods
with similar factor intensity are usually overlooked (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). More
generally, since any form of trade entails an increase in the e⁄ective size of markets, the
distributional mechanism discussed in this paper is likely to be always at work. In stark contrast
with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin view, our results suggest that in some cases the scarce factor
bene￿ts the most from trade. Although the concept of scarcity we refer to is in absolute terms,
and not relative to other countries as in the factor-proportions trade theory, it is nonetheless
possible to build examples in which the factor-bias of scale dominates the Stolper-Samuelson
e⁄ect, so that the distributional implications of the standard trade theory are overturned.
To elaborate on this point, we now analyze the e⁄ects of trade integration between dissimilar
8The possibility of an upward sloping demand curve due to the endogenous reaction of technology is also
emphasized in Acemoglu (1998).
9The assumption of an inelastic supply of factors guarantees that our models will always have a unique
equilibrium even with an upward sloping factor demand curve. If both the supply and demand curves are
upward sloping, multiple equilibria may arise. In the presence of a dynamic adjustment process, stability of an
equilibrium will be an issue if the demand curve is steeper than the supply curve, i.e., if factor endowments are
very responsive to prices. In this case, short run adjustment costs may guarantee local stability.
16countries on relative factor prices in the simplest model with contestable markets (the other
models would yield very similar results). Free trade factor prices can be found substituting
world endowments in (9) instead of domestic values.10 Totally di⁄erentiating equation (9), we
can decompose the e⁄ects of trade integration, interpreted as an increase in both Vi and Vj,


























where again a hat denotes a proportional variation. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side shows
the impact on relative rewards of changes in the relative scarcity of factors, in the absence of
any scale e⁄ects (i.e., when Fi and Fj are very small and/or Vi and Vj very large): according to
it, factors becoming relatively scarcer will see their relative price increase, as in the standard
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory. The second term, instead, is the scale e⁄ect, showing that
when ￿ > 1 scale tends to bene￿t more the ￿scarce￿factor or, more precisely, the factor with
a lower employment to ￿xed cost ratio. When trade integration takes place between identical
countries, relative scarcity does not change (b Vi = b Vj) and only the scale e⁄ect survives (unless
Fi=Vi = Fj=Vj, in which case scale is immaterial too). Also, as ￿ ! 1, the relative scarcity
e⁄ect disappears while the contribution of scale becomes the strongest. Thus, if ￿ is high, a
small country that is scarce in factor i relative to the rest of the world may experience an
increase in the relative reward of factor i after trade opening, provided that factor i is also
scarce in the absolute sense of condition (10).
Finally, we brie￿ y discuss the empirical support of the key assumptions at the root of our
results. First, on the production side, we assumed ￿rm-level scale economies that decrease
with ￿rm size, since they are generated by ￿xed costs. This is consistent with recent plant-
level evidence. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) use plant-level manufacturing data for Mexico
to show that most industries exhibit increasing returns to scale that typically decrease with
larger plant sizes. Similarly, Tybout et al. (1991) and Krishna and Mitra (1998) ￿nd evidence
of a reduction in returns to scale in manufacturing plants after trade liberalization in Chile and
India, respectively.11 Second, the market structure in our models involves variable markups.
In this respect, the evidence is compelling. Country studies reported in Roberts and Tybout
(1996), which use industry and plant-level manufacturing data for Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Turkey and Morocco, ￿nd that increased competition due to trade liberalization is associated
with falling markups. Similar results using a di⁄erent methodology are found, among others,
10This is true as long as factor price equalization (FPE) holds, which is guaranteed by the speci￿c factor
assumption. In more general models where both factors are employed in both sectors, we would require that
countries￿endowments not be too dissimilar (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985, for a de￿nition of the FPE set).
11See also Tybout (2001) on this point.
17by Levinshon (1993) for Turkey, Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India, and Harrison (1994)
for Cote d￿ Ivoire, while Gali￿(1995) provides cross-country evidence that markups fall with
income. Further, business cycles studies show that markups tend to be countercyclical (see
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, for a survey), which is again consistent with our hypothesis.
3 An Application to Wage Inequality
A prominent application of our results is in the debate over the causes of the rise in skill
premia that took place since the early 1980s. The theoretical literature has identi￿ed three
main culprits: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarity and international
trade. Our theory suggests the existence of a neglected link among these explanations, namely,
the skill bias of scale. In this section, we ￿rst discuss some available evidence supporting the
empirical validity of the assumptions needed for an increase in market size to lead to a higher
skill premium. Then, in section 3.1, we provide a test of the mechanism underlying the skill bias
of scale according to our theory, which builds on the pro-competitive e⁄ect. To this purpose,
we use a large panel of US industries to show that markups tend to be higher in skill-intensive
sectors and fall with scale, the more so the higher the skill-intensity. Finally, in section 3.2, we
brie￿ y discuss the related literature on wage inequality.
If goods produced with di⁄erent skill-intensity are gross substitutes, conditions (10) and
(18) imply that scale is skill-biased when skilled workers are a minority in the total workforce,
use technologies with relatively high ￿xed costs and produce highly di⁄erentiated goods. All
these conditions are likely to be met in the real world. As for the latter two, note that skill-
intensive productions often involve complex activities, such as R&D and marketing, that raise
both ￿xed costs and the degree of product di⁄erentiation. Regarding the share of skilled
workers in the total workforce, we can refer to the Barro-Lee database to make a crude cross-
country comparison. Identifying skilled workers as those with college education (as in a large
part of the empirical literature), we ￿nd that in 2000 the percentage of skilled workers ranged
from a minimum of 0.1% in Gambia, to a maximum of 30.3% in the U.S., with New Zealand
ranking second with a share of 16% only.
Further, and most important, the model￿ s prediction of sectoral asymmetries in the scale
elasticity of output ￿nds support in two recent empirical studies. Antweiler and Tre￿ er (2002),
using international trade data for 71 countries and ￿ve years, ￿nd that skill-intensive sectors,
such as Petroleum Re￿neries and Coal Products, Pharmaceuticals, Electric and Electronic
machinery and Non-Electrical Machinery, have an average scale elasticity around 1.2, whereas
traditional low skill-intensive sectors, such as Apparel, Leather, Footwear and Food, are char-
acterized by constant returns. Using a di⁄erent methodology, Paul and Siegel (1999) estimate
returns to scale in US manufacturing industries for the period 1979-1989. Their estimates of
18sectoral scale economies are strongly positively correlated with the sectoral skill-intensity.12
For these asymmetries to be consistent with a rise in the skill premium, we also need
the elasticity of substitution between goods produced with di⁄erent factor-intensity, ￿, to be
greater than one. In Epifani and Gancia (2002), we show that in the years from 1980 to 2000
the relative expenditure on skill-intensive goods in the US increased by more than 25%, while
the relative price of traditional, low skill-intensive goods increased by more than 25%, a result
broadly consistent with most of the studies on product prices surveyed in Slaughter (2000).
In Figure 2 we plot the relationship between the log relative expenditure on modern goods,
log(Eh=El), and the log relative price of traditional goods, log(Pl=Ph). The slope coe¢ cient
and standard error of the regression line in the ￿gure are 0.44 and 0.08, respectively, with
an R-squared of 0.62. The estimated coe¢ cient implies an elasticity of substitution of 1.44,
consistent with our assumption.13 Moreover, indirect evidence also suggests that the elasticity
of substitution between low and high skill-intensive goods is signi￿cantly greater than one. In
particular, in our model the aggregate elasticity of substitution in production between skilled
and unskilled workers is equivalent to the elasticity of substitution in consumption between
low and high skill-intensive goods. Several studies provide estimates of the former parameter
and most of them are above one.14
Finally, by predicting that the aggregate relative demand for skilled workers is increasing
with size, our model provides an explanation for the empirical ￿nding by Antweiler and Tre￿ er
(2002) that a 1% scale increase brings about a 0.42% increase in the relative demand for skilled
workers. Evidence of skill-biased scale e⁄ects is also found by Denny and Fuss (1983) in their
study of the telecommunication industry, and by Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998) and
Feenstra and Hanson (1999), who all ￿nd that skill upgrading is positively and signi￿cantly
associated with variation in industry size in their studies of wage inequality in the US.15
12See also Epifani and Gancia (2002) on this point.
13When controlling for the log of per capita GDP, the coe¢ cient of the relative price is slightly reduced (0.36),
but is still signi￿cant at the 7%-level (with a standard error of 0.19). In contrast, the per capita GDP coe¢ cient
is positive (0.02), as expected, but small and imprecisely estimated (its standard error equals 0.05).
14Freeman (1986) suggests a value of the elasticity of substitution between more and less educated labor in
the range between 1 and 2. Hamermesh and Grant (1979) ￿nd a mean estimate of 2.3. Lastly, Krusell et al.
(2000) and Katz and Murphy (1992) report estimates for the US economy of 1.67 and 1.41, respectively.
15When our model is interpreted as describing a single sector, it can easily explain the positive association
between skill upgrading and variation in industry size. Assume, in particular, that sector i is made of two
sub-sectors, h and l, the former using only skilled workers and the latter only unskilled workers. Then, equation
(3) implies that in this sector the relative income share of skilled workers, ￿(h)i =
whHi
wlLi , is proportional to the
relative output of the two sub-sectors (Yhi=Yli). Hence, under the assumptions discussed earlier (￿ > 1 and a
higher markup in sub-sector h), an increase in the size of sector i brings about an increase in Yhi=Yli and in the
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Figure 2: Elasticity of substitution between low and high skill-intensive goods. Source: Epifani
and Gancia (2002)
3.1 The Pro-competitive Effect of Scale: Evidence from U.S. Industries
We now provide evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale according to
our theory. For scale to be skill-biased, our theory requires that the following conditions be
satis￿ed: a) markups must be higher in the skill-intensive industries; b) a rise in the size
of an industry must bring about a pro-competitive e⁄ect which reduces markups; c) the pro-
competitive e⁄ect must be stronger in the skill-intensive industries. If these conditions are met,
a scale increase raises the relative demand for skilled workers provided that the elasticity of
substitution between low and high skill-intensive goods is also greater than one. This suggests
the following simple (and yet demanding) test: upon observing a panel of industry-level data
on markups, MKit, skill-intensity, (H=L)it, and industry size, Yit, we may run the following
regression:
MKit = ￿0Yit + ￿1(H=L)it + ￿2 ((H=L)it ￿ Yit) + ￿i + dt + X0
it￿ + "it; (28)
where i and t index industries and time, respectively, ￿i and dt are industry and time ￿xed-
e⁄ects, Xit is a vector of controls and "it is a random disturbance. The pro-competitive
20e⁄ect of a scale expansion suggests that the expected sign of ￿0 is negative; the expected
sign of ￿1 is instead positive, since our theory implies that markups are higher in the skill-
intensive industries. Finally, the interaction term, (H=L)it ￿ Yit, allows to test whether the
pro-competitive e⁄ect of scale expansion is stronger in the skill-intensive industries and the
expected sign of ￿2 is negative.
Unfortunately, data on industry-level markups are not readily available, because prices and
marginal costs are rarely observed. To circumvent this problem, two main approaches can be
followed. One is to estimate markups from a structural regression a l￿ Hall (1988). For our
purposes, one problem with this approach is that, to estimate markups across industries or
over time, either the time or industry dimension is to be sacri￿ced, which means that markups
have to be assumed constant over time or across industries. In contrast, the test of our theory
requires markups to vary both across industries and over time.
Alternatively, markups can be constructed using data on industry sales and total costs.
This is the approach advocated by Tybout (2001) and widely used in the empirical literature
on the pro-competitive e⁄ect of trade liberalization in the developing world (e.g., Roberts and
Tybout, 1996). Here, we follow this methodology and use price-cost margins as a proxy for
industry markups. Constructed markups have in fact the advantage of being variable both
across industries and over time.
We apply our test to data from the NBER Productivity Database by Bartelsman and Gray.
As far as we know, this is the most comprehensive and highest quality database on industry-
level inputs and outputs, covering about 450 US manufacturing industries at the 4-digit SIC
level for the period between 1958 and 1996. Moreover, the NBER ￿le has been widely used
to investigate the determinants of the recent rise in US wage inequality.16 Here, we show a
novel way of exploiting information in this dataset to uncover a potentially relevant mechanism
underlying the evolution of wage inequality in the US.
In our benchmark speci￿cations, price-cost margins are computed as the value of shipments
(adjusted for inventory change) less the cost of labor17, materials and energy, divided by the
value of shipments. As a proxy for industry size we use the real value of shipments. Finally,
following a standard practice in the empirical literature on wage inequality, we proxy skilled
workers with non-production workers, and therefore our measure of skill-intensity is the ratio
of non-production to production workers. Consistent with our model, this measure of skill-
intensity is positively correlated with price-cost margins: the simple correlation between the
16See, in particular, Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998), and Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
17We would ideally want to disentangle the ￿xed from the variable cost of labor, instead of lumping them
together in the overall cost of labor. Note, however, that the cost of labor reported in the NBER ￿le does not
include the wages of employees in headquarters and support facilities, which represent a relevant share of the
overall ￿xed cost of labor and accounted for more than 10 percent of total payroll in manufacturing in 1986.
21two variables equals 0.3.
Capital-intensive industries generally require higher price-cost margins to cover the cost
of capital. Following Roberts and Tybout (1996), we therefore control for the capital-output
ratio, (K=PY )it. Note also that our de￿nition of price-cost margins implicitly assumes that
all capital expenditures constitute ￿xed costs, which is not, in general, true. To address this
problem, we recompute the price-cost margins by directly netting out capital expenditures.
We ￿nd that our results are independent of whether we treat capital expenditures as a ￿xed
or a variable cost.
We add more controls to the speci￿cation of equation (28) in order to isolate the pro-
competitive e⁄ect of scale expansion from other relevant sources of variation in price-cost
margins. In particular, if entry is less than perfect in the short run, an increase in industry
pro￿tability would both stimulate entry and raise the price-cost margin, thereby inducing a
positive association between industry size and price-cost margins. Hence, in order to better
isolate the e⁄ect of exogenous variation in industry size on the price-cost margins, we control
for industry pro￿tability.18 A way to do this is by using the index of total factor productivity
(TFP5) reported in the NBER ￿le. However, this control is likely to be endogenous and may
induce a bias in the estimation of our coe¢ cients of interest. Therefore, in order to address
the endogeneity bias due to reverse causation between industry size and price-cost margins,
we also estimate equation (28) by instrumental variables. Interestingly, both procedures lead
to similar results.
Finally, we include two controls related to import competition. Our model shares with
other models the standard implication that foreign competition reduces markups. To capture
this e⁄ect, we use the ratio of imports to the value of shipments, (M=PY )it, as a proxy for
the intensity of foreign competition. Our data on US imports by 4-digit SIC industry (1972-
basis) for the the period from 1958 to 1994 come from the NBER Trade Database by Feenstra.
Our model also suggests that the pro-competitive e⁄ect of foreign competition is stronger
in the skill-intensive industries. To capture this e⁄ect, we also include the interaction term
(H=L)it ￿ (M=PY )it, whose coe¢ cient is therefore expected to be negative.
Our ￿rst set of results is reported in Table 1. Here, we estimate various speci￿cations of
equation (28) by using the ￿xed-e⁄ects within estimator. The dependent variable is the price-
cost margin gross of capital expenditures. We always include time dummies to avoid spurious
results due to correlation of our covariates with time e⁄ects. In column (1), we estimate our
baseline regression without controls. Note that the coe¢ cients of the skill-intensity and of
the interaction term between skill-intensity and industry size have the expected sign and are
signi￿cant at the 1-percent level. In contrast, the coe¢ cient of industry size is signi￿cant
18See also Roberts and Tybout (1996) and Hoekman et al. (2001) on this point.
22but wrongly signed, suggesting that an expansion in industry size is associated with a rise
in price-cost margins. As mentioned earlier, this result is not surprising, since an increase in
pro￿tability should stimulate entry, thereby increasing the size of an industry together with
the price-cost margin. Therefore, without controlling for variation in industry pro￿tability, the
coe¢ cient ￿0 would be upward biased and the pro-competitive e⁄ect of scale expansion would
be underestimated. Indeed, as shown in column (2), when using the TFP index to control for
variation in industry pro￿tability, the negative impact of industry size on price-cost margins is
restored and is signi￿cant beyond the 1-percent level. Note, also, that the coe¢ cient of TFP
is highly signi￿cant and large in magnitude, and that the coe¢ cients of the other explicatives
have the expected sign and are also signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
In column (3), we also control for the capital-output ratio, whose coe¢ cient is signi￿cant
but wrong signed.19 The coe¢ cients of our main variables are the same order of magnitude
and are signi￿cant at the 1-percent level. Finally, in column (4) we add the two covariates that
control for the e⁄ects of foreign competition on price-cost margins: import penetration (the
ratio of imports to the value of shipments) and the interaction term between skill-intensity and
import penetration. As expected, the coe¢ cients of both variables are negative and signi￿cant
at the 1-percent level, while the other coe¢ cients are una⁄ected. This suggests that import
competition reduces markups and that this e⁄ect is stronger in the skill-intensive industries.
Since the within estimator uses only temporal variation to estimate the coe¢ cients, in
column (5) we complement our analysis by rerunning our previous speci￿cation using the
random-e⁄ects estimator. Note that the coe¢ cients of all covariates (except for the capital-
output ratio) have the expected sign and are signi￿cant beyond the 1-percent level. They
are also similar to those estimated by ￿xed-e⁄ects, which suggests that using also sectional
variation to estimate the coe¢ cients does not a⁄ect much the results.20
Although the results reported in Table 1 represent an interesting test of our theory, they
leave some important methodological issues unsolved. In particular, while ￿xed-e⁄ects regres-
sions remedy the endogeneity problems that can be traced to the unobservable time-invariant
industry heterogeneity, they do not address the simultaneity bias due to mutual interaction
between the left and right-hand side variables, and in particular between the price-cost mar-
gins and industry size. Therefore, we rerun various speci￿cations of (28) by using instrumental
variables. Table 2 reports the results of the ￿xed-e⁄ects-instrumental-variables estimation.
In all speci￿cations, we instrument all right-hand side variables using their lagged values as
19A negative coe¢ cient of the capital-output ratio in ￿xed-e⁄ects regressions of the price-cost margins is
recurrent in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1996). As shown in Table 2, this anomaly
disappears when using instrumental variables.
20However, Hausman￿ s speci￿cation test strongly suggests that treating unobservable industry heterogeneity
as random may lead to misspeci￿cation.
23instruments. The choice of the lag structure of instruments is dictated by the Sargan test
of overidentifying restrictions. In particular, the test always rejects the null-hypothesis of in-
struments validity when using close lags of the endogenous covariates as instruments. Some
experimentation suggests, however, that the 5th to 7th lag (or the 6th to 8th lag) turn out to
be appropriate instruments for most endogenous covariates in all speci￿cations.21 As shown by
the p-value of the Sargan test in the bottom line of the upper part of Table 2, the exogeneity
of these instruments is never rejected.
Using distant lags of endogenous covariates as instruments raises a concern about weak
instruments, in which case estimation by instrumental variables would be biased in the same
direction as estimation by least squares. Therefore, in the bottom part of Table 2 we report
the F-statistics for the null-hypothesis that excluded instruments are jointly insigni￿cant in
the ￿rst stage regressions. Note that in all ￿rst stage regressions the F-statistic of the excluded
instruments is very high, suggesting that our instruments are not weak.22
Since the above tests of instruments validity raise the con￿dence in our instrumental vari-
ables estimates, we can now comment the main results in Table 2. In column (1), we estimate
equation (28) without controls. Note that the coe¢ cients of all variables suggested by our the-
ory have the expected sign and are highly signi￿cant. Moreover, columns (2) to (4) show that
adding controls to our baseline regression does not a⁄ect the main results. It is remarkable, in
particular, that even without controlling for TFP (columns (1)-(3)), the coe¢ cient of industry
size, which captures the pro-competitive e⁄ect of scale expansion, is always negative and highly
signi￿cant, just as in columns (2)-(4) of Table 1, where we do control for TFP. This suggests
that controlling for TFP in a non-IV regression washes out much of the simultateneity bias
due to mutual interaction between price-cost margins and industry size. Finally, note that the
coe¢ cient of the capital-output ratio is now positive and highly signi￿cant, as expected.
Finally, we test for the robustness of our results with respect to capital costs. In particular,
we recompute the price-cost margins by directly netting out capital expenditures, de￿ned as
(rt + ￿)Kit￿1, where Kit￿1 is capital stock, rt is the real interest rate and ￿ is the depreci-
ation rate. Data on US real interest rates come from the World Bank-World Development
Indicators.23 As for the depreciation rate, we choose a value of ￿ equal to 7%, implying that
capital expenditures equal, on average, roughly 10 percent of the capital stock.24 The main
results are reported in Table 3, where we rerun various speci￿cations of (28), by ￿xed-e⁄ects
21Exceptions are the TFP and the real value of shipments, for which we generally use more distant lags.
22Staiger and Stock (1997) have in fact shown that Two Stage Least Squares estimates are unreliable when
the ￿rst stage F-statistic is less than ten.
23The US real interest rate has a mean value of 3.75 percent (with a standard deviation of 2.5 percent) over
the period of analysis.
24The depreciation rates used in the empirical studies generally vary from 5% for buildings to 10% for
machinery.
24in columns (1)-(3), and by instrumental-variables in columns (4)-(7). Note that the pattern of
coe¢ cients is very similar to that shown in previous tables. In particular, as in Table 1, adding
controls to the baseline speci￿cation turns the coe¢ cient of industry size negative and highly
signi￿cant in the ￿xed-e⁄ects regressions. Moreover, as in Table 2, the coe¢ cient of industry
size is always negative and highly signi￿cant in the instrumental-variables regressions (even
without controlling for TFP). Finally, all the coe¢ cients (except one) of the main variables of
interest are signi￿cant beyond the 1-percent level under both estimation procedures.
To conclude, the evidence on US industries suggests that a scale expansion brings about a
pro-competitive e⁄ect which reduces markups; moreover, the pro-competitive e⁄ect is stronger
in the skill-intensive industries, where markups are higher. These are the mechanics of our
theory.
3.2 Related Literature
A few recent papers have identi￿ed alternative and more speci￿c channels through which larger
markets may be associated with a higher demand for skill. Neary (2002) shows that in the
presence of oligopolistic markets, increased competition encourages strategic over-investment
by incumbent ￿rms in order to deter entry. This raises the ratio of ￿xed to variable costs and,
assuming that ￿xed costs are skill-intensive, also the skill premium. In Ekholm and Midelfart-
Knarvik (2001), ￿rms can choose between two technologies: one exhibits high skill-intensive
￿xed costs and low unskill-intensive marginal costs, while the other exhibits low ￿xed costs and
high marginal costs. They then show that a trade-induced expansion in market size raises the
relative pro￿tability of the skill-intensive technology, thereby raising the skill premium. A limit
of this model, where ￿xed costs are skill-intensive and there is free entry, is that it tends to imply
counterfactually that markups should rise with skill premia. Yeaple (2005) also builds a model
where ￿rms can choose between two technologies with a di⁄erent ratio of ￿xed to marginal
costs. In addition, he also allows for worker skill heterogeneity. Interestingly, he ￿nds that
￿rms with higher ￿xed costs end up hiring relatively more skilled workers, which is consistent
with our assumption that ￿xed costs are higher in the skill-intensive industries. Otherwise, the
two models are very di⁄erent, since Yeaple￿ s model builds on a trade-induced selection e⁄ect
and is mainly aimed at explaining within-group wage inequality, whereas our model builds on
a pro-competitive e⁄ect and is more suited for explaining average skill premia. Dinopulous
and Segerstrom (1999) argue that, in models of endogenous technical change, trade can a⁄ect
the skill-premium by changing the reward to innovation: if trade, by expanding the market
for new technologies, raises the reward to innovation and the R&D sector is skill-intensive,
then it will naturally push up the skill premium. This interesting explanation seems unlikely
to be a major driving force behind the dramatic shifts in the demand for skill given the small
25size of the R&D sector (about 2% of GDP in the US) and its stability through time. Finally,
in Epifani and Gancia (2002), we show that in the presence of an elasticity of substitution
in consumption greater than one and stronger increasing returns in the skill-intensive sector,
trade integration, even among identical countries, is skill-biased. We also provide evidence
in support of our main assumptions. However, the model in the paper does not provide a
microfoundation for the sectoral asymmetries in the scale elasticity of output.
Our result that scale is skill-biased also provides an important link among major expla-
nations for the worldwide rise in skill premia: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill com-
plementarity and international trade. According to the ￿rst, inequality rose because recent
innovations in the production process, such as the widespread introduction of computers, have
increased the relative productivity of skilled workers.25 In this respect, an important implica-
tion of our model is that, independent of the speci￿c features of technological improvements,
factor augmenting technical progress may appear skill-biased simply because it raises the total
supply of e⁄ective labor in the economy and therefore its scale. Similarly, the capital-skill
complementarity argument (see Krusell et al. (2000), among others) emphasizes that, since
new capital equipment requires skilled labor to operate and displaces unskilled workers, its
accumulation raises the relative demand for skilled labor. More generally, we have shown that,
even in the absence of capital-skill complementarity (indeed, even in the absence of physical
capital, though straightforward to incorporate), factor accumulation tends to be skill-biased
because it expands the scale of production. Finally, it is often argued that North-South trade
liberalization may have increased wage inequality in advanced industrial countries through the
well-known Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect. However, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is silent on
the distributional e⁄ects of North-North (or South-South) trade, which represents the large
majority of world trade. Our model suggests, instead, that any kind of trade integration, by
increasing the market size for goods, is potentially skill-biased.
In summary, we add to the literature on the determinants of wage inequality by illustrating
a mechanism which, although very simple, is surprisingly more general than the existing ones,
since it applies not only to trade-induced increases in market size but to any scale expansion.
Further, and most important, it does not rely on speci￿c assumptions on technology, but
rather provides a microfoundation for why skill-intensive sectors become more productive as
an economy grows.
25See, among others, Autor et al. (1998) for empirical evidence and Aghion (2002) for theoretical perspectives.
264 Conclusions
We have shown that, under plausible and fairly general assumptions about market structure,
preferences and technology, scale is non-neutral on factor rewards. The mechanics of our
result can be summarized as follows. In the presence of ￿rm-level ￿xed costs and free entry,
economies of scale are endogenous and equal markups. Therefore, less competitive sectors are
characterized by higher equilibrium scale economies, which implies that a market size increase
brings about a rise in their relative output. As long as ￿nal goods are gross substitutes
(complements) and sectoral production functions are homothetic in the inputs they use, this
translates into a rise (fall) in the relative reward of the factor used intensively in the less
competitive sectors. These are sectors characterized by a lower factor employment, higher
￿xed costs, or a higher degree of product di⁄erentiation.
We have also shown that, when applied to low and high-skill workers, our theory predicts
that scale is skill-biased. We have provided evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill
bias of scale according to our theory. In particular, using the NBER Productivity Database,
we have shown that the evidence on US industries suggests that a rise in industry size reduces
markups, and that the fall of markups is greater in the skill-intensive industries, where they are
higher. This evidence suggests that the mechanics of skill-biased scale e⁄ects may be e⁄ectively
at work in the real world.
5 Appendix
Contestable markets with Cobb-Douglas production functions
We now extend the simple model of contestable markets to study a situation where each
good is a Cobb-Douglas composite of both factors, Vi and Vj. The total cost function of each
producer of yi is thus modi￿ed as follows:





with 1 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿j ￿ 0, i.e., yi is intensive in factor i. Demand for factors in each sector can
be derived applying Shephard￿ s lemma. Then, de￿ning ! ￿ wi=wj and imposing the factor
market clearing conditions,
Vi = ￿i!￿i￿1(Fi + ciyi) + ￿j!￿j￿1(Fj + cjyj)





27we can solve for sectoral output:












An analogous expression gives Yj. Note that sectoral output is increasing in the supply of its







In the jargon of trade economists, these are just Rybczynski derivatives.
To see the factor-bias of scale, it su¢ ces to compute the scale elasticity of output and
refer to condition (6), showing, e.g., that with ￿ > 1 scale is biased towards the factor used






!1￿￿iVi ￿ ￿j!￿￿iVj ￿
1 ￿ ￿j
￿




As in the simpler models in the main text, the scale elasticity of output in sector i has the
following properties: it is decreasing in Vi and approaches one as Vi tends to in￿nity, it is
increasing in Fi, and independent of ci. Moreover, now eYi
s rises with Vj. This simple extension
con￿rms that increasing returns will be stronger in the sector using intensively the scarce factor
(in absolute terms) and subject to higher ￿xed costs.
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31Table 1. Pro-competitive effect of scale expansion (Fixed-Effects) 
Dependent variable: price-cost margin (MKit) 
Indep.  variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  FE FE FE FE RE 
       
Yit    .012**  -.067*** -.089*** -.084*** -.060*** 
  (.005) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.006) 
       
(H/L)it   .135***   .121***   .125***   .086***   .080*** 
  (.027) (.026) (.026) (.030) (.029) 
       
Yit ⋅ (H/L)it  -.017*** -.016*** -.016*** -.017*** -.013*** 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
       
TFPit      .305***   .299***   .301***   .278*** 
    (.011) (.011) (.012) (.012) 
       
(K/PY)it     -.060***  -.068***  -.050*** 
    (.006)  (.006)  (.006) 
       
(M/PY)it      -.014***  -.016*** 
     (.003)  (.003) 
       
(H/L)it⋅ (M/PY)it     -.014***  -.015*** 
     (.002)  (.002) 
       
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  16981 16981 16981 15395 15395 
Groups  448 448 448 433 433 
R-squared  .18 .22 .22 .21 .21 
Notes: all variables in logs. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 
and 10-percent levels, respectively. Estimation is by Fixed-Effects (within) in columns (1)-
(4) and by Random-Effects in column (5). Coefficients of time dummies not reported. Data 
sources: NBER Productivity Database (by Bartelsman and Gray) and NBER Trade 




















Table 2. Pro-competitive effect of scale expansion (IV) 
Dependent variable: price-cost margin (MKit) 
Indep.  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Yit  -.066*** -.063*** -.075*** -.111*** 
  (.014) (.014) (.019) (.021) 
      
(H/L)it   .312***   .260***   .379***   .306** 
  (.106) (.097) (.128) (.150) 
      
Yit ⋅ (H/L)it  -.022** -.020** -.032** -.030** 
  (.011) (.010) (.014) (.015) 
      
(K/PY)it      .093***   .119***   .119*** 
    (.021) (.025) (.026) 
      
(M/PY)it     -.032**  -.053*** 
    (.015)  (.017) 
      
(H/L)it⋅ (M/PY)it    -.001  -.010 
    (.008)  (.009) 
      
TFPit        .234*** 
     (.066) 
      
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Sargan test .650 .854 .833 .131 
F-statistics of excluded instruments in first stage regressions 
Yit  515 510 262 183 
(H/L)it  102 108 54  33 
Yit ⋅ (H/L)it  190 189 94  60 
(K/PY)it    221 119 75 
(M/PY)it    100  62 
(H/L)it ⋅ (M/PY)it    172  111 
TFPit     6 3  
Observations  12057 12056 10662 9820 
Groups  448 448 433 433 
R-squared  .07 .06 .05 .03 
Notes: all variables in logs. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = 
significant at the 1, 5 and 10-percent levels, respectively. Coefficients of time 
dummies not reported. Estimation is by Fixed-Effects (within) Instrumental-
Variables. All RHS variables are treated as endogenous using their lagged 
values as instruments. Time dummies are always used as additional 
instruments. The bottom half of the table reports the F-statistics for the null 
that excluded instruments do not enter first stage regressions. Data sources: 
NBER Productivity Database (by Bartelsman and Gray) and NBER Trade 
Database (by Feenstra). 
 
  
Table 3. Pro-competitive effect of scale expansion (netting out capital expenditures) 
Dependent variable: price-cost margin net of capital expenditures 
Indep.  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  FE FE FE IV  IV IV IV 
         
Yit    .136*** -.065*** -.049*** -.089*** -.094*** -.108*** -.160*** 
  (.008) (.010) (.011) (.024) (.023) (.030)   (.031) 
         
(H/L)it   .151***   .122***   .047   .702***   .649***   .853***   .626*** 
  (.043) (.041) (.048) (.196) (.168) (.226) (.224) 
         
Yit ⋅ (H/L)it  -.024*** -.019*** -.020*** -.061*** -.062*** -.088*** -.068*** 
  (.006) (.006) (.006) (.020) (.018) (.023) (.022) 
         
(K/PY)it      -.327***   -.339***     -.106***   -.067   -.102** 
     (.010)   (.010)     (.038)   (.044)    (.041) 
         
(M/PY)it     -.014***      .027    .030 
    (.005)    (.024)  (.024) 
         
(H/L)it⋅ (M/PY)it    -.025***      .007    .006 
    (.003)    (.014)  (.013) 
         
TFPit      .329***    .329***       .323*** 
   (.017)  (.019)     (.068) 
         
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  16818 16818 15245 11899 11898 10517 10517 
Groups  448 448 433 448 448 433 433 
R-squared  .13 .21 .21 .05 .11 .09 .15 
P-value Sargan test     .155  .313 .184 .121 
F-statistics of excluded instruments in first stage regressions 
Yit     520  498  250  219 
(H/L)it     90  96  47  41 
Yit ⋅ (H/L)it     182  182  90  77 
(K/PY)it      197  81  76 
(M/PY)it       98  86 
(H/L)it ⋅ (M/PY)it       170  147 
TFPit        124 
Notes: all variables in logs. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. Coefficients of time dummies not reported. Estimation is by Fixed-Effects (within) in columns (1) to (3) and 
by Instrumental-Variables in columns (4) to (7). In IV regressions, all RHS variables are treated as endogenous using 
their lagged values as instruments. Time dummies are always used as additional instruments. The bottom half of the 
table reports the F-statistics for the null that excluded instruments do not enter first stage regressions. Data sources: 
NBER Productivity Database (by Bartelsman and Gray), NBER Trade Database (by Feenstra) and World Development 
Indicators (World Bank). 
 